CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—PEOPLE v. GRIGGS: ILLINOIS IGNORES MORAN v. BURBINE TO EXPAND A SUSPECT\u27S MIRANDA RIGHTS by Roumeliotis, Chrisoula I.
Western New England Law Review
Volume 16 16 (1994)
Issue 2 Article 5
1-1-1994
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—PEOPLE v.
GRIGGS: ILLINOIS IGNORES MORAN v.
BURBINE TO EXPAND A SUSPECT'S
MIRANDA RIGHTS
Chrisoula I. Roumeliotis
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
Chrisoula I. Roumeliotis, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—PEOPLE v. GRIGGS: ILLINOIS IGNORES MORAN v. BURBINE TO
EXPAND A SUSPECT'S MIRANDA RIGHTS, 16 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 329 (1994), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/
vol16/iss2/5
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PEOPLE V. GRIGGS: ILLINOIS 
IGNORES MORAN V. BURDINE TO EXPAND A SUSPECT'S MIRANDA 
RIGHTS 
INTRODUCTION 
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination pro­
vides that a criminal defendant may not be compelled to be a wit­
ness against himself or herself.! In Miranda v. Arizona? the United 
States Supreme Court created the presumption that a defendant's 
statement made during a custodial interrogation is compelled unless 
the defendant is first warned of his or her right to silence and right 
to an attorney, and, then, waives these rights.3 Such a waiver of the 
right to remain silent and the right to counsel is valid, provided that 
it is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.4 Since Miranda, 
courts repeatedly have confronted scenarios in which a suspect pur­
ports to waive his or her right to counsel without being informed of 
the present availability of an attorney who is requesting to consult 
with the suspect. The issue is whether the purported waiver is 
knowing and intelligent. 
In People v. Griggs,5 a suspect, who knew that his sister was in 
the process of retaining an attorney for him, waived his right to 
have counsel present during interrogations.6 The Supreme Court of 
Illinois determined that the waiver was invalid because, although 
Griggs was fully informed of his right to an attorney before the in­
terrogation commenced, he was never informed that his attorney 
had arrived at the police station and had demanded to consult with 
him.7 The court reasoned that the waiver was not made knowingly 
and intelligently.s Although the court based its decision on the 
Federal Constitution, it seemed to ignore United States Supreme 
1. See infra note 14 for the text of the Fifth Amendment. 
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
3. Id. at 444-45; see infra notes 21-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
Miranda. 
4. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
5. 604 N.E.2d 257 (III. 1992). 
6. Id. at 258. 
7. Id. at 269. 
8. Id. at 269-70. 
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Court precedent, Moran v. Burbine,9 in which a suspect, who was 
unaware that an attorney had been retained for him and had sought 
to speak with him, waived his right to counsepo The Burbine Court 
held that such a waiver was valid.ll Instead, the Griggs court based 
its decision on People v. Smith,12 in which the Illinois Supreme 
Court had held that such waivers are invalid.13 
lpis Note critiques the Griggs court's analysis. Part I provides 
an examination of case law on this issue. Part II discusses the facts 
and majority, concurring and dissenting opinions of People v. 
Griggs. Part III analyzes the majority opinion of Griggs and con­
cludes that the court reached the correct conclusion, but with a 
faulty analysis. Finally, in Part III, this Note will present a more 
convincing analysis which supports the Griggs conclusion. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. 	 The Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel and Right Against 
Self-Incrimination 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution estab­
lishes the privilege against self-incrimination.14 One consequence 
of this provision is that police officers, detectives, prosecutors, and 
other governmental parties opposing the interests of a defendant in 
a criminal prosecution are prevented from compelling a defendant 
to testify against his or her interests.15 If testimonial statements are 
compelled, they will not be admitted in a subsequent prosecution.16 
Since the 1930s, the United States Supreme Court has relied on 
various means to regulate police interrogation proceduresP Such 
9. 475 U.S. 412 (1986). 
10. Id. at 417-18. 
11. Id. at 421-24. 
12. 442 N.E.2d 1325 (Ill. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 937 (1983). 
13. Id. at 1329. 
14. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of 
War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). 
15. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457-58 (1966). 
16. [d. at 478-79. 
17. The Supreme Court first attempted to control abuses resulting from coercive 
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regulatory devices were necessary to nUllify the inherently coercive 
nature of police interrogations, which were made significantly more 
coercive by various police tactics.18 In 1966, the United States 
Supreme Court turned to the Fifth Amendment19 to curb abuses 
which occur during the interrogation process.20 
interrogations through a Fourteenth Amendment due process approach, called the vol­
untariness test. See Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 935, 
954-84 (1966); Laurence A. Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court's Vol­
untariness Doctrine in Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 113-17 (1989); Ger­
ald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 V AND. L. REV. 1417, 1428-35 (1985); Joseph 
D. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859, 
891-924 (1979). Realizing that the ad hoc nature of the due process approach was un­
workable, the Supreme Court briefly applied the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
protection to pre-indictment interrogation proceedings. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 
U.S. 478, 484-92 (1964). See also Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. 
REv. 935, 996-1021 (1966). However, this approach was extremely criticized and subse­
quently abandoned, once the Supreme Court established that the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel only attaches once a defendant has been indicted. Massiah v. United 
States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). 
18. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445-58. Various techniques and procedures were 
adopted by police departments to nearly ensure that a self-incriminating statement 
would eventually be made. In the early part of this century, physical brutality was a 
common method of obtaining confessions. [d. at 445-46 & n.5. More recently, how­
ever, police officers turned to psychological coercion. [d. at 448. A study of police 
manuals found that interrogators were advised to employ a variety of tactics to secure a 
confession. This study demonstrated that successful interrogations must be conducted 
in private. [d. at 449 (quoting INBAU & REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CON. 
FESSIONS 1 (1962». Furthermore, these manuals provided that: 
To highlight the isolation and unfamiliar surroundings, ... the police [are in­
structed] to display an air of confidence in the suspect's guilt and ... to main­
tain only an interest in confirming certain details. The guilt of the subject is to 
be posited as a fact. The interrogator should direct his [or her] comments 
toward the reasons why the subject committed the act, rather than ... asking 
the subject whether he [or she] did it .... 
[T]he major qualities an interrogator should possess are patience and perse­
verance.... [The interrogator] "must dominate his [or her] subject and over­
whelm him [or her] with his [or her] inexorable will to obtain the truth. He [or 
she] should interrogate for a spell of several hours .... In a serious case, the 
interrogation may continue for days ... with no respite from the atmosphere 
of domination." 
The interrogators sometimes are instructed to induce a confession out of 
trickery ... [and] to point out the incriminating significance of ... refus[ing] to 
talk.... 
[d. at 450-54 (citations omitted) (quoting O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL IN· 
VESTIGATION (1956». 
19. In using the Fifth Amendment as the source of protection of criminal defend­
ants during custodial interrogations, the Supreme Court did not displace Sixth Amend­
ment or Fourteenth Amendment protections. Rather, it supplemented them. See 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
20. See infra notes 21-36 and accompanying text. 
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Miranda v. Arizona21 is the landmark decision that established 
concrete guidelines for police interrogations in order to ensure that 
a suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is 
protected.22 The Supreme Court created the Miranda warnings as a 
protective device to make a suspect aware of his or her rights, thus 
diminishing the coercive nature of interrogations.23 Before custo­
dial interrogations24 commence, a suspect must be warned of his or 
her rights and must waive them. Miranda mandates that police pro­
vide the following warnings: 
He [or she] has the right to remain silent, that anything he [or 
she] says can be used against him [or her] in a court of law, that 
he [or she] has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that 
if he [or she] cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for 
him [or her] prior to any questioning if he [or she] so desires.25 
Although Miranda does not require that this precise statement be 
given, the statement which is provided must be equally effective.26 
The requirement of advising a suspect that he or she has the 
right to have counsel present during police questioning is an added 
method of eliminating the inherently coercive nature of an interro­
gation and safeguarding a suspect's Fifth Amendment rights.27 
"The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can oper­
ate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of 
his [or her] privilege by his [or her] interrogators. Therefore, the 
right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to 
the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege . . . . "28 
Having been provided with a Miranda warning, a suspect may 
choose to waive his or her right to remain silent and to have counsel 
present during the interrogation and proceed to make a state­
21. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
22. Id. at 441-42. 
23. Id. at 457-58, 467-68. 
24. The term "custodial interrogations" refers to questioning that occurs after a 
suspect has been taken into police custody. Id. at 444. For further analysis and defini­
tions of custody and interrogation, see Maria Sileno DeLoughry, Twenty-First Annual 
. Review 	of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 
1990-1991, 80 GEO. L.J. 939, 1078-83 (1992). 
25. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. Once this warning is given, all subsequent question­
ing must cease if a suspect requests an attorney at any time during the interrogation. Id. 
at 473-74. The police must not initiate further questioning unless an attorney is present. 
Id. at 474. However, having invoked the right to counsel, a suspect may still waive it by 
voluntarily initiating a conversation and providing information. Id. at 475. 
26. Id. at 467-68. 
27. Id. at 469-74. 
28. Id. at 469. 
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ment.29 A presumption arises, however .. against a' valid waiver of a 
constitutional right.3D In addition, the Supreme Court in Miranda 
explicitly stated that the government has a "heavy burden" to prove 
that the waiver was in fact made knowingly, intelligently, and vol­
untarily.31 As the Court has subsequently clarified, a voluntary 
waiver is one that is free from coercion, intimidation, deception,32 
threats, trickery, or cajoling.33 An intelligent and knowing waiver is 
one "made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right 
being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon 
it. "34 
To determine if a waiver is valid, a "totality of the circum­
stances" approach is used in which the background, experience, and 
conduct of the accused are considered.35 If it is determined that a 
suspect validly waived his or her Fifth Amendment privilege, the 
police may question the suspect and use any information obtained 
in a subsequent court proceeding.36 
B. The Validity of Waivers 
Although the judicial creation of the Miranda warnings served 
to protect an interrogated suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege, the 
application of this protective approach has not been easy. One is­
sue that frequently arises is the validity of a waiver of the Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel in the following situation. Often, a 
suspect is arrested, brought to a police station or jail, read his or her 
Miranda warnings, and, upon waiving them, interrogated. Mean­
while, unknown to the suspect, a relative or friend has retained an 
attorney to assist the suspect. The attorney subsequently tele­
phones or arrives at the location where the suspect is being held 
and asks to consult with the suspect-client. However, the police pre­
vent the attorney from doing so. The suspect is not informed of his 
or her attorney's efforts until after the suspect has produced an in­
criminating statement. 
This issue has been considered under both the Federal Consti­
29. [d. at 475. 
30. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938) (citing Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 
301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n of Ohio, 301 U.S. 
292, 307 (1937); Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882». 
31. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. 
32. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). 
33. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476. 
34. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421. 
35. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 
36. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475-76, 478-79. 
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tution and state constitutions.37 Courts have disagreed whether a 
waiver of the right to counsel in this situation is valid. 
1. Federal Constitutional Analysis 
a. State Courts' Application of the Federal Constitution Before 
Burbine 
Well before People v. Smith38 was decided, various state courts 
set the stage for what was to eventually become the holding in 
Smith.39 One case which was relied on by both Smith and Griggs is 
State v. Haynes.4o In Haynes, the Supreme Court of Oregon held 
that statements made by a suspect following a waiver of the right to 
have an attorney present during questioning are not admissible at 
trial when the police do not inform the suspect, who is unaware that 
an attorney has been retained, of the attorney's availability and ef­
forts to consult with the suspect.41 The court held that these state­
ments were inadmissible because a suspect cannot knowingly and 
intelligently waive the right to counsel without this information.42 
The Haynes court's reasoning has been restated in many subse­
quent cases, and was based on both the United States Constitution 
and the Oregon Constitution.43 In reaching its conclusion that a 
waiver under these circumstances is neither intelligent nor knowing, 
the Supreme Court of Oregon reasoned: 
To pass up an abstract offer to call some unknown lawyer is very 
37. See infra notes 38-140 and accompanying text. 
38. See infra notes 46-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of Smith. 
39. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McKenna, 244 N.E.2d 560 (Mass. 1969). In Mc­
Kenna, the defendants had each asked their relatives to call an attorney. However, the 
defendants were never informed that their attorneys attempted to reach them. The 
court held that the attorneys invoked the defendants' right to counsel on their behalf, 
that the sergeant had a "heavy" duty to inform the defendants of their attorneys' ef­
forts, and that his failure to do so denied the defendants their opportunities to exercise 
their Fifth Amendment right to counsel. As a result, the waivers became invalid be­
cause without awareness of the attorneys' presence, the defendants could not knowingly 
and intelligently waive this right. Id. at 564-66. See also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hil­
liard, 370 A.2d 322, 324 (Pa. 1977) (holding that "[i]f counsel has expressed a desire to 
be present during interrogation, a waiver of counsel obtained in counsel's absence 
should be held invalid as a matter of law" and that the right to counsel has not been 
validly waived when an attorney has been denied access to a client, even if the client has 
failed to request counsel); State v. Jones, 578 P.2d 71, 73 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (holding 
that a waiver is not knowing and intelligent when a defendant has not been made aware 
of his or her attorney's efforts to offer advice). 
40. 602 P.2d 272 (Or. 1979) (en bane), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 945 (1980). 
41. [d. at 277. 
42. [d. 
43. [d. at 279. 
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different from refusing to talk with an identified attorney actually 
available to provide at least initial assistance and advice, 
whatever might be arranged in the long run. A suspect indiffer­
ent to the first offer may well react quite differently to the sec­
ond. If the attorney appears on request of one's family, that fact 
may inspire additional confidence. . .. [W]hen law enforcement 
officers have failed to admit counsel to a person in custody or to 
inform the person of the attorney's efforts to reach him [or her], 
they cannot thereafter rely on defendant's "waiver" for the use of 
his [or her] subsequent uncounseled statements or resulting evi­
dence against him [or her].44 
Haynes and several similar decisions45 formed the basis for the 
decision in People v. Smith.46 In Smith, the Supreme Court of Illi­
nois held that where an attorney is present in the police station in 
which a suspect is being held, and requests to speak with this sus­
pect-client, if the police do not inform the suspect of such attorney's 
efforts to consult with him or her, any waiver of the right to counsel 
is invalid.47 Therefore, any statements made by the suspect are 
inadmissible in court and violate the Fifth Amendment of the Fed­
eral Constitution.48 
In this case, the defendant, Dan Smith, was arrested and 
charged with murder and armed robbery on September 1, 1978.49 
On the morning of September 2, he met with an attorney, Joseph 
Spiezer, who agreed to represent him.50 Later that day, this attor­
ney telephoned his partner, Carol Ellerby, and asked her to consult 
with the defendant in jail.51 Ellerby went to the jail at 3 p.m. on 
September 2.52 She was told by an employee at the jail that she 
could not see the defendant because he was experiencing heroin 
withdrawal.53 Since she was not allowed to see him, she instead 
asked the employee to give the defendant her business card, on 
which she had written that she was a partner of Spiezer and that the 
defendant should not provide any statements to the police without 
the presence of one of his attorneys.54 The defendant received this 
44. Id. at 278-79 (footnotes omitted). 
45. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text. 
46. 442 N.E.2d 1325 (Ill. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 937 (1983). 
47. Id. at 1329. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 1326. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
I I 
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card.55 However, he was never told of Ellerby's request to see 
him.56 On September 3, the defendant gave an incriminating state­
ment in which he confessed to murder.57 Relying on various state 
court cases,58 including State v. Haynes,59 the Supreme Court of Illi­
nois concluded that the defendant did not knowingly and intelli­
gently waive his right to counsel since the police interfered with his 
attorney's attempts to consult with him.60 
b. 	 The United States Supreme Court's Application of the Federal 
Constitution: Moran v. Burbine 
In Moran v. Burbine,61 the United States Supreme Court took 
the opposite approach on the matter of waivers in factual situations 
similar to Smith and Haynes. The Court held that where a suspect 
is unaware that an attorney has been retained and is attempting to 
consult with him or her, that suspect's waiver of the right to counsel 
is valid even though the police do not inform the suspect of the 
attorney's efforts or availability.62 In Burbine, defendant Brian 
Burbine was arrested for burglary.63 On the evening of his arrest, 
his sister contacted the public defender's office to retain counsel for 
him.64 Assistant Public Defender Allegra Munson took the case 
and telephoned the police station to notify the police that she 
would represent Burbine during any questioning.65 She was told 
that Burbine would not be questioned that day. However, one hour 
later, the police began the first of many interrogations of Burbine.66 
The defendant was not aware that his sister had retained counsel 
for him and was never informed of the attorney's telephone cal1.67 
During the interrogations, the defendant waived his right to counsel 
55. 	 [d. at 1327. 
56. 	 [d. 
57. 	 [d. at 1326. 
58. See, e.g., State v. Matthews, 408 So. 2d 1274 (La. 1982); Commonwealth v. 
McKenna, 244 N.E.2d 560 (Mass. 1969); Commonwealth v. Hilliard, 370 A.2d 322 (Pa. 
1977); State v. Jones, 578 P.2d 71 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978). For a discussion of these cases, 
see supra note 39 and infra note 99. 
59. 602 P.2d 272 (Or. 1979) (en bane), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 945 (1980); see supra 
notes 40-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of Haynes. 
60. 	 Smith, 442 N.E.2d at 1328-30. 
61. 	 475 U.S. 412 (1986). 
62. 	 [d. at 421-24. 
63. 	 [d. at 416. 
64. 	 [d. 
65. 	 [d. at 417. 
66. 	 [d. 
67. 	 [d. 
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and eventually confessed to a murder that had occurred several 
months earlier.68 This confession was put in the form of signed 
written statements, which were admitted into evidence at tria1.69 
Consequently, Burbine was convicted of murder.70 The Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit reversed' his conviction on the grounds 
that the waiver was invalid because, by failing to inform the defend­
ant of his attorney's phone call, the police officer deprived him of 
information which was essential to his ability to waive his rights 
knowingly and intelligently.71 The United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to resolve this matter.72 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Burbine argued that he did 
not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel because 
the police's failure to notify him of the attorney's call deprived him 
of information necessary to make a knowing and intelligent 
waiver.73 The United States Supreme Court disagreed.74 The 
Court concluded that the waiver was knowing and intelligent.75 
The Supreme Court grounded its holding on various theories. 
First, it reasoned that events which occur outside of the suspect's 
presence, and of which he or she is unaware, do not affect his or her 
ability to knowingly waive the right to counsel.76 The fact that the 
police actively interfered with the defendant's learning of this infor­
mation did not change this result, according to the CourU7 Instead, 
the only information that must be supplied to a defendant, and the 
transmission of which cannot be interfered with, is that information 
which affects his or her ability to understand the nature of his or her 
Fifth Amendment rights and the consequences of waiving them.78 
The defendant did not lack such information here because he was 
68. [d. at 416-18. 
69. [d. at 418. 
70. [d. 
71. Burbine v. Moran, 753 F.2d 178, 187-88.(lst Cir. 1985). 
72. Moran v. Burbine, 471 U.S. 1098 (1985). 
73. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421. 
74. [d. 
75. [d. The Court did not examine whether the waiver was voluntary. This factor 
was not at issue. [d. at 421-22. 
76. [d. at 422. The Court agreed that the information would have been useful, 
but concluded that the Constitution does not require that the police provide a suspect 
with all possible information with which to reach a decision. [d. 
77. [d. at 423. In fact, the Court stated that "[a]lthough highly inappropriate, 
even deliberate deception of an attorney could not possibly affect a suspect's decision to 
waive his [or her] Miranda rights unless he [or she] were at least aware of the incident." 
[d. 
78. [d. at 424. 
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fully informed of his right to remain silent and to an attorney. Ac­
cording to the Court, the fact that an attorney was actually available 
was not necessary to understand one's Fifth Amendment rights and 
the resulting consequences of waiving them.79 
Second, the Court reasoned that creating a rule that forbids the 
police from deceiving an attorney is not required by the Fifth 
Amendment.80 The Fifth Amendment protects a suspect from self­
incrimination. It does not protect an attorney's efforts to reach his 
or her client.8! 
Third, the Court reasoned that a contrary decision would be 
impractical and unworkable, and would reduce Miranda's clarity.82 
The Court stated that a contrary holding would create various un­
answered questions.83 Courts would be forced to resolve: 
To what extent should the police be held accountable for know­
ing that the accused has counsel? Is it enough that someone in 
the station house knows, or must the interrogating officer himself 
[or herself] know of counsel's efforts to contact the suspect? Do 
counsel's efforts to talk to the suspect concerning one criminal 
investigation trigger the obligation to inform the defendant 
before interrogation may proceed on a wholly separate matter?84 
Fourth, although requiring the police to inform a suspect of an 
attorney's efforts to reach him or her would add to the Fifth 
Amendment protection against coercive interrogations, the gain in 
actual protection would be minimal. In contrast, the cost would be 
great, since it would result in a decrease in the number of confes­
sions.85 Based on the totality of these reasons, the Court reached 
79. Id. In fact, the Court stated that: 
Once it is determined that a suspect's decision not to rely on his [or her] rights 
was uncoerced, that he [or she] at all times knew he [or she] could stand mute 
and request a lawyer, and that he [or she] was aware of the State's intention to 
use his [or her] statements to secure a conviction, the analysis is complete and 
the waiver is valid as a matter of law. 
Id. at 422-23 (footnote omitted). 
80. Id. at 424-25. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 425-26. 
83. Id. at 425. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 426-27. Confessions of guilt are highly sought after in the criminal jus­
tice system. Id. at 426. However, imposing a duty on police officers to inform defend­
ants of their attorneys' availability will in effect guarantee that the defendant will not 
make a statement. Most attorneys advise their clients to remain silent. Escobedo v. 
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488 (1964). 
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its conclusion that the waiver in this case was valid.86 
In addition to the defendant's appeal on a Fifth Amendment 
basis, Burbine also made an argument under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.87 He claimed that the police's conduct in lying to his 
attorney was so egregious that his Fourteenth Amendment due pro­
cess rights were violated.88 On this theory, the Court held that the 
"conduct falls short of the kind of misbehavior that so shocks the 
sensibilities of civilized society as to warrant a federal intrusion into 
the criminal processes of the States."89 However, the Court did 
state that police deception might amount to a due process violation 
if the conduct were more offensive than· that here.90 
The three-member dissent in Moran v. Burbine91 presented 
four principal arguments. First, the dissent pointed to numerous 
state court cases that have reached the conclusion that a waiver in 
this type of case would be invalid, since information concerning an 
attorney's efforts to reach a client directly impacts an intelligent 
and knowing waiver of the right to counsel.92 Second, the dissent 
argued that the majority's holding is inimical to the American Bar 
Association's Standards for Criminal Justice, which advise that a 
suspect in custody should be put in contact with an attorney "'as 
soon as feasible after custody begins"'93 or '''[alt the earliest oppor­
tunity."'94 Third, the dissent argued that the police's deliberate de­
ception in the form of lying to the attorney and withholding 
information from the defendant amounted to the type of trickery 
that the Fifth Amendment condemns and that renders a waiver in­
86. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421-28. 
87. [d. at 432-34. Defendant Burbine also presented a third argument. He 
claimed that the police violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by preventing his 
attorney from consulting with him. [d. at 428-29. The Court rejected this claim, holding 
that this right attaches only after a defendant has been formally charged with a crime 
and adversarial proceedings have commenced. A custodial interrogation, on the other 
hand, occurs before the suspect has been charged and is not adversarial in nature. [d. at 
428-32. 
88. [d. at 432. 
89. [d. at 433-34. 
90. [d. at 432. 
91. 475 U.S. at 434-68 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J. and Marshall, 
J.). 
92. [d. at 439 & n.10 (quoting Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus 
Curiae 4, n.2). 
93. [d. at 440 & n.11 (quoting ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 5-71 (2d ed. 
1980». 
94. [d. 
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valid.95 Fourth, the dissent claimed that the police's interference in 
the attorney's communication with the defendant amounted to a 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment due process requirement 
of fundamental fairness. 96 
2. State Constitutional Analysis 
The question of whether a waiver in this situation is valid has 
also been brought before many state courts, which have resolved 
the issue on the basis of the state's own constitution, as opposed to 
the Federal Constitution.97 State courts have relied on state consti­
tutions primarily because they have been dissatisfied with the pro­
tections provided under the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and have sought to offer additional protection to ar­
restees under their state constitutions.98 This has been common 
practice both before99 and after100 Burbine was decided. State 
95. Id. at 452-55; see supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text for factors that 
would render a waiver invalid. 
96. 475 U.S. at 466-68. Whereas the majority adopted a "shock the conscience" 
test to determine if due process has been violated, the dissent adhered to a fundamental 
fairness test. Id. at 466-67. The dissent stated that "due process requires fairness, integ­
rity, and honor in the operation of the criminal justice system, and in its treatment of 
the citizen's cardinal constitutional protections." Id. at 467. 
97. See infra notes 99-100 for cases decided on the basis of state constitutions. 
98. The Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution applies to the states via the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,8 (1964). The Federal Constitu­
tion provides a baseline of protections below which a state cannot go. Thus, when ap­
plying a Federal Constitutional provision, states are required to adhere to the 
interpretation and application of this provision made by the United States Supreme 
Court. However, states are permitted to offer greater constitutional protections under 
their own constitutions. In addition, states are permitted to independently interpret the 
Federal Constitution in areas where the United States Supreme Court has not spoken. 
See infra notes 228-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of this matter. 
99. See, e.g., State v. Matthews, 408 So. 2d 1274 (La. 1982). In Matthews, the 
Supreme Court of Louisiana reasoned that the Louisiana Constitution supports ensur­
ing the assistance of counsel during custodial interrogations and prohibits any interfer­
ence with this right. Therefore, the court held that a suspect cannot knowingly and 
intelligently waive his or her right to counsel preceding an interrogation where the po­
lice do not inform the suspect of an attorney's efforts to assist him or her. Id. at 1277­
78. 
100. See, e.g., State v. Stoddard, 537 A.2d 446, 451-52 (Conn. 1988) (holding that 
the Connecticut Constitution requires that police inform a suspect of an attorney's ef­
forts to assist in order to make a subsequent waiver valid); Bryan v. State, 571 A.2d 170, 
175-76 (Del. 1990) (holding that the Delaware Constitution creates a heavy presump­
tion against waiver where a suspect has expressed a desire to talk to police only in the 
presence of an attorney and the police fail to inform the suspect of an attorney's efforts 
to render assistance); Haliburton v. State, 514 So. 2d 1088, 1089-90 (Fla. 1987), cert. 
denied, l.i1 S. Ct. 2910 (1991) (holding that the failure of the police to notify the de­
fendant that an attorney requested to consult with him deprived the defendant of infor­
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courts have unanimously held that waiveJ;s in a Burbine situation 
are invalid.lOl 
3. What Have Courts Done Since Burbine? 
Since Burbine was decided, various state courts and three fed­
eral courts of appeals have examined this issue. Until the Griggs 
case, all courts that considered this issue under the United States 
Constitution, both with facts substantially similar to those in 
Burbine or significantly different, have followed the holding in 
Burbine.102 
a. Facts That Are Substantially Similar to Burbine 
Since Burbine, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
and various state courts,I03 including the Supreme Court of Illinois, 
have considered the issue of the validity of a waiver where a suspect 
is unaware that someone has retained counsel for him or her and is 
not informed of his or her attorney's efforts to render assistance. 
Burbine's holding has been adhered to unanimously. 
The Supreme Court of Illinois followed the holding in Burbine 
and rejected its own precedent in People v. SmithlO4 when it ruled 
mation necessary to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel and 
violated the due process clause of the Florida Constitution); People v. Wright, 490 
N.W.2d 351, 354-57 (Mich. 1992) (holding that the Michigan Constitution requires that 
the police inform a suspect of an attorney's efforts to contact the suspect and that fail­
ure to so inform a suspect, along with deliberate deception of the attorney in stating 
that the suspect knew of his presence yet did not wish to see him, rendered a waiver of 
the right to counsel invalid for failure to be voluntary, intelligent, and knowing); State v. 
Reed, 627 A.2d 630, 646-47 (N.J. 1993) (holding that police must inform a suspect of his 
or her attorney's availability and desire to consult with the suspect, and failure to do so 
violates the suspect's right against self-incrimination under the New Jersey Constitu­
tion); Roeder v. State, 768 S.W.2d 745, 753-55 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the 
Texas Constitution requires that a suspect be informed of an attorney's efforts to reach 
him or her for a waiver to be knowing and intelligent). 
101. See supra notes 99-100. 
102. See infra notes 103-40 and accompanying text. 
103. See, e.g., Jones v. Dugger, 928 F.2d 1020, 1026-27 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub 
nom. Jones v. Singletary, 112 S. Ct. 216 (1991) (holding that a waiver pf the right to 
counsel is valid even though a family-retained attorney is prevented from contacting the 
defendant); Lodowski v. State, 513 A.2d 299, 304 (Md. 1986) (holding that failure of the 
police to inform the suspect that counsel had been retained for him and was seeking 
access to him does not violate the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution); State 
v. Hanson, 401 N.W.2d 771, 776-78 (Wis. 1987) (deciding under Wisconsin Constitution, 
but since its provision regarding the privilege against self-incrimination is "virtually 
identical" to that of the Federal Constitution, Burbine is applicable; court held that 
since police officers had no duty to inform the defendant of his attorney's efforts to 
consult with him, the defendant's waiver is valid). 
104. 442 N.E.2d 1325 (Ill. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 937 (1983). 
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on the validity of a waiver in People v. Holland. lOs In Holland, the 
defendant was initially arrested for "improper vehicle registration, 
driving on a revoked license, and illegal transportation of alco­
hol."l06 Subsequently, he was connected to a sexual assault that 
had occurred earlier that day.I07 Meanwhile, the defendant's wife 
had contacted an attorney, Ant!:lOny Rocco, who telephoned the 
police station and asked that he be notified if the defendant were 
placed in a lineup.lo8 The attorney did not request to speak directly 
to the defendant, however.l09 Then, without being notified of his 
attorney's call, the defendant was interrogated on two separate oc­
casions. He had been properly given his Miranda warnings before 
both interrogations.110 During the second interview, the defendant 
gave an incriminating statement in which he confessed to the 
crime.lll The defendant was eventually permitted to consult with 
his attorney, but not until after he had incriminated himself.1l2 
On appeal from conviction, the state urged the court to adopt 
the holding in Moran v. Burbine, thus validating the waiver,113 On 
the other hand, the defendant urged the court to follow the holding 
in People v. Smith, which would render the waiver invalid.1l4 The 
court concluded that Burbine was on point, while Smith was 
"clearly distinguishable."lls Holland was similar to Burbine since, 
in both cases, the suspect was unaware that a relative had retained 
counsel and all communication occurred by telephone.116 In con­
trast, the attorney in Smith was retained by the suspect and had 
personally met with the suspect.117 Also, the attorney's partner 
went to the jail where the defendant in Smith was held and re­
quested to meet with the defendant, instead of merely telephon­
ing.118 Thus, concluding that Holland was similar to Burbine, the 
court applied Burbine's holding and decided that the defendant's 
waiver of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was 
105. 520 N.E.2d 270 (Ill. 1987), affd, 493 U.S. 474 (1990). 
106. Id. at 273. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 273-74. 
109. Id. at 274, 282. 
110. Id. at 273-74. 
111. Id. at 273-75. 
112. Id. at 275. 
113. Id. at 277. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
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valid.n9 
b. Facts That Are Different from Burbine 
Burbine has also been applied to situations in which the de­
fendants were aware of the efforts of a third party to retain counsel 
for them. In People v. Ledesma,120 the California Appeals Court 
reviewed a case in which the defendant had arranged to meet with 
an attorney at the end of his working day in order to turn himself 
in.121 However, before he was able to meet with this attorney, he 
was arrested.122 During subsequent interrogations, Ledesma never 
invoked his right to counsel and proceeded to incriminate him­
self.123 In addition, Ledesma was never informed of his attorney's 
attempts to reach him.t24 However, the California Appeals Court 
held that Ledesma's waiver was valid under Burbine.125 In fact, the 
court stated that "[t]he present case affords an even stronger basis 
for upholding the trial court's admission of a statement obtained 
during police interrogation than was presented in Burbine"126 since 
in this case, Ledesma himself had planned to confer with an identi­
fied attorney, while in Burbine, the defendant was unaware that an 
attorney had been retained for him.127 
A similar argument was used by the Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit in Matney v. Armontrout.l28 In this case, the defend­
ant had personally retained counsel, who was prevented from 
speaking with his client.129 The Matney court also concluded that 
the Burbine holding must control. Notably, the court said that "[a] 
defendant who retains counsel, then waives his [or her] right to such 
counsel upon arrest, exhibits an even greater understanding of the 
nature of his [or her] legal rights and, consequently, [makes] an in­
telligent waiver of such rights."13o 
Furthermore, Burbine was regarded as controlling in State v. 
119. [d. at 277-78. 
120. 251 Cal. Rptr. 417 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
121. [d. at 418. 
122. [d. 
123. [d. at 419. 
124. [d. 
125. [d. at 423-24. 
126. [d. at 423. 
127. [d. 
128. 956 F.2d 824 (8th Cir. 1992). 
129. [d. at 825. 
130. [d. at 826. 
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Earls,131 a case in which, after being arrested, the defendant tele­
phoned his ex-wife and asked her to contact an attorney.132 Subse­
quently, his ex-wife did contact an attorney who, although never 
retained, telephoned the police station and asked to speak with the 
defendant.133 This request was denied.134 The majority noted that 
this case differed from Burbine in two respects. First, the counsel in 
this case was never retained and never demanded that the police 
not question the defendant outside of his presence, whereas the at­
torney in Burbine was retained, demanded that the interrogation 
stop, and requested to be present during questioning.135 Second, in 
this case, the defendant was aware that his ex-wife was contacting 
an attorney, whereas in Burbine, the defendant was not aware of his 
sister's efforts.136 The court held that Earls' waiver was valid under 
Burbine because his ability to make a knowing, intelligent, and vol­
untary waiver was not affected.137 
Lastly, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit applied 
Burbine in Middleton v. Murphy,13s a case in which the defendant 
asked his wife to contact an attorney, who was subsequently denied 
access to the defendant upon arriving at the police station.139 The 
court held that the officers were not required to inform him of his 
attorney's presence and that the waiver was valid.140 
The Supreme Court of Illinois had the opportunity to review a 
similar factual situation in People v. Griggs. However, instead of 
following Burbine, the court relied on People v. Smith, a Supreme 
Court of Illinois case that was decided before Burbine .. 
II. PEOPLE V. GRIGGS141 
A. Facts 
A clash between youths in Chicago provided the setting for 
People v. Griggs. Defendant Terry Griggs' and his brother, Milton, 
were accompanying their niece home from the neighborhood 
131. 805 P.2d 211 (Wash. 1991). 
132. Id. at 212. 
133. Id. at 213. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 219. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. Middleton v. Murphy, 996 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir.), available as No. 92-1498, 
1993 WL 217156, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 607 (1993). 
139. Id. at *3. 
140. Id. at *7. 
141. 604 N.E.2d 257 (III. 1992). 
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school when an altercation, which eventually led to the death of an 
innocent third party, commenced.142 
Terry and Milton encountered a group of teenage males with 
whom unfriendly words were exchanged and a physical fight almost 
ensued.143 After this first encounter, the defendant and Milton 
brought their niece to her home, which she shared with the defend­
ant's mother.l44 Then, the defendant procured a gun from his 
mother's home, and left with Milton to locate the boys.145 A sec­
ond fight almost ensued, but was averted.146 Afterward, the de­
fendant and Milton began to walk back to their mother's house.147 
The group of teenage boys was behind them. The defendant testi­
fied that the group of boys wished to provoke another fight and that 
they were carrying baseball bats.l48 The defendant further testified 
that the group of boys began to chase him, that they threw some­
thing at him, and that they attempted to physically grab him.149 The 
defendant claimed that he was afraid of being killed.150 He stated 
that this fear led him to remove the gun from his pocket and to 
begin shooting in the air. l51 A bullet struck and killed Carpel 
Jahnke, a gas company employee, who happened to be working in 
the vicinity.152 
In contrast to the defendant's testimony, the state's witnesses, 
some of the boys, testified that the defendant and his brother pro­
voked the two fights.153 Also, they testified that they did not chase 
the defendant and that they did not have any weapons.154 Instead, 
they happened to be following him because they were walking to a 
7-11 (a convenience store) which was located in the direction in 
142. [d. at 261. 
143. [d. 
144. [d. 
145. [d. 
146. [d. at 265. 
147. [d. 
148. [d. at 265-66. 
149. [d. at 266. 
150. [d. The defendant's sister corroborated the defendant's testimony that he 
and his brother were being chased by this group of boys who were carrying various 
weapons. [d. at 264. The defendant also testified that there had been a previous alter­
cation between the defendant's brother and one of these boys, during which the boy 
threw a bottle at Milton. [d. at 265. They both testified that their neighborhood was 
rife with gangs. [d. . 
151. [d. at 266. 
152. [d. at 258, 266. 
153. [d. at 261. 
154. [d. at 262. 
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which the defendant and his brother' were walking.155 Finally, they 
testified that the defendant did not fire his gun into the air, but 
rather aimed and fired directly at the group of boYS.156 
Within minutes after the shooting, the defendant was arrested 
and taken to the police station for questioning.157 Approximately 
1-1/2 hours later, or around 5:30 p.m., the defendant spoke with his 
sister who told him that she and another of his sisters were in the 
process of procuring an attorney for the defendant.158 Subse­
quently, the defendant was interrogated on two separate occasions. 
The first interrogation of the defendant occurred between 6:00 and 
7:00 p.m.159 The second interrogation occurred between 9:00 and 
9:30 p.m.160 During both interviews, the defendant was informed of 
his Fifth Amendment right to silence and right to have counsel 
present during any questioning; yet, during both interrogations, 
Griggs waived these rights and made oral statements.16I The sec­
ond interview, during which he confessed to the murder, was re­
duced to writing and was signed by the defendant at approximately 
10:00 p.m.162 This statement did not include any information upon 
which a defense of self-defense could be formulated.163 The Mi­
randa warnings were printed on this document. l64 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 258. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 259. 
161. Id. at 258-59. 
162. Id. at 259. This statement said: 
That on February 5, 1986 at, approximately, 3:15 p.m. Terry and his brother 
Milton were walking down the street when they ran into about six or seven 
guys. The six or seven guys started swearing at Terry and Milton. Terry and 
Milton then get [sic] into a physical fight but continued walking home. Once 
inside Terry got a .38 caliber gun from under his mother's bed and put it in his 
coat pocket. Then Terry told Milton that he wanted to go outside and talk 
with the guys on the street. Terry and Milton walked about a block and a half 
before they ran into the same guys again. Terry approached them and asked 
to talk to them. Then they agreed to fight one-on-one. Milton and another 
guy fought but a girl broke it up by telling Terry and Milton that Milton was 
too old to fight. After the fight Terry and Milton start-Milton started walk­
ing home. During the fight Terry didn't see any weapons drawn by anyone. 
As they were going home Terry turned around and saw the same guys follow­
ing them at the same pace. When they were, approximately, one house away 
from their mother's house Terry took the gun out of his jacket and starting 
firing four times. 
Id. at 263. 
163. Id. at 270. 
164. Id. at 263. 
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Meanwhile, around 6:00 or 6:30 p.m., the defendant's sister re­
tained Attorney Edward Kalish to represent the defendant.165 Ka­
lish proceeded to the police station, arriving between 9:00 and 9:30 
p.m.166 Upon arriving, Kalish informed the desk sergeant that he 
wished to speak with the defendant.167 The desk sergeant re­
sponded that Kalish would need to wait because the defendant was 
being interrogated.168 Approximately ten minutes later, Kalish 
again informed the desk sergeant that he wished to meet with the 
defendant immediately and that the interrogation must cease.169 
The sergeant did not allow Kalish to meet with the defendant pO 
Afterward, Kalish spoke with the state's attorney, restating his need 
to speak with the defendant. l7l The state's attorney refused to in­
terrupt the interrogation. l72 Kalish was finally permitted to see the 
defendant after midnight,173 many hours after the defendant was 
interrogated and after the defendant had given incriminating 
statements. 
Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress the statement 
given during the second interrogation on the ground that his waiver 
was not valid because he was not informed that his attorney, whom 
he knew his sister was retaining, was attempting to reach him.174 
The circuit judge denied the motion to suppress.175 Following trial, 
the defendant was found guilty of murder and sentenced to serve 
twenty years in prison.176 The defendant appealed his conviction. 
The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed.177 Subsequently, the defend­
165. [d. at 259. 
166. [d. 
167. [d. 
168. [d. 
169. [d. 
170. [d. at 259-60. 
171. [d. at 260. 
172. [d. 
173. [d. 
174. [d. at 258. 
175. [d. at 260-61. The judge said: 
I find from listening to the evidence that the defendant did not request to see 
an attorney either before or during questioning. Whether Kalish was out in 
the station during the written-during the interrogation which was reduced to 
writing is unclear. He certainly wasn't there during the time the oral state­
ment was given. But even if he was there during the course of the written 
interrogation and asked that he would be able to see the defendant I do not 
think that would invalidate the statement. 
[d. 
176. [d. at 257-58. 
177. [d. at 258. The Appellate Court's decision is unpublished. 
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ant filed a petition for leave to appeal, which was allowed by the 
Supreme Court of IllinoisY8 The Supreme Court of Illinois re­
versed, holding that Griggs' waiver was invalid.179 
B. Majority Opinion 
The Supreme Court of Illinois relied on People v. Smithl80 in 
reaching its decision, rejecting the holdings in both People v. Hol­
landI81 and Moran v. Burbine.182 First, the Griggs court concluded 
that Holland did not overrule Smith183 because the two cases are 
factually distinguishable.184 In Holland, there was no evidence that 
the defendant's attorney ever attempted to consult with the defend­
ant.18S "Since there was no evidence that the attorney requested 
access to the client, there could have been no wrongful denial of 
attorney access and no reason to apply the rule of Smith to the facts 
presented in Holland."186 In fact, the Griggs court agreed that it 
would reach the same decision on the facts presented in Holland 
(where a suspect does not know that an attorney has been retained 
and where the attorney does not attempt to gain access to the sus­
pect, a waiver is valid).187 Thus, the court concluded that Smith was 
not overruled and was still good law.188 
Second, the Griggs court reasoned that Burbine was inapplica­
ble to Griggs because the cases are distinguishable.189 The court 
focused on the fact that in Burbine, the defendant was not aware 
that an attorney had been retained for him, whereas it was alleged 
that Griggs knew that his sister was retaining an attorney for him.l90 
Furthermore, the Griggs court stated that police interference with 
an attorney's attempted access to a client does affect a suspect's 
ability to knowingly and intelligently relinquish the right to coun­
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 269,271. 
180. 442 N.E.2d 1325 (Ill. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 937 (1983). 
181. 520 N.E.2d 270 (Ill. 1987), affd, 493 U.S. 474 (1990). 
182. 475 U.S. 412 (1986). 
183. 604 N.E.2d at 267. The state in Griggs argued that Illinois adopted the hold­
ing of Burbine in Holland and that, therefore, Smith was overruled sub silentio. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
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sel.191 The Supreme Court of Illinois concluded that there cannot 
be a knowing waiver of the right to counsel unless the defendant is 
informed of an attorney's presence.192 Without this piece of infor­
mation, a waiver cannot be made with complete awareness of the 
right being abandoned and the consequences of abandoning it.193 
Third, the court pointed to other cases in which courts have 
suppressed statements made by a defendant during a custodial in­
terrogation where the police have interfered with an attorney's at­
tempts to consult with a suspect.194 These include cases decided on 
the basis of state constitutions,195 and cases decided before Smith 
on the basis of the Federal Constitution.196 The court specifically 
mentioned State v. Haynes,197 a case upon which the Smith court 
principally relied.198 
Having rejected the applicability of Holland and Burbine, the 
Griggs court concluded that the Smith holding was on point.199 The 
court reasoned that police interference in the form of failing to no­
tify a suspect of an attorney's presence and efforts to consult with a 
client significantly affects a knowing and intelligent waiver.2OO This 
interference bars communication that directly bears on one's deci­
sion of whether or not to waive the right to counsel.2°1 Thus, the 
court affirmed the holding in Smith that a suspect cannot knowingly 
and intelligently waive his or her right to counsel if the suspect has 
not been made aware that the suspect's attorney was present and 
was attempting to meet with him or her.202 Specifically, the court 
held: 
that a suspect's waiver of his [or her] right to counsel is invalid if 
police refuse or fail to inform a suspect who knows that an attor­
ney has been retained for him [or her] of the efforts of the attor­
191. [d. at 268-69; see supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text for the Burbine 
Court's position on this matter. 
192. 604 N.E.2d at 269. 
193. [d. at 268; see supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text for the elements of a 
valid waiver. 
194. [d. at 267-68. 
195. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. 
196. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
197. 602 P.2d 272 (Or. 1979) (en bane), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 945 (1980). 
198. 604 N.E.2d at 268; see supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text for a discus­
sion of Haynes; see also supra notes 46-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
Smith. 
199. 604 N.E.2d at 267-69. 
200. [d. at 268-69. 
201. [d. at 268. 
202. [d. at 269. 
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ney, present at the place of interrogation, to render assistance to 
the suspect.203 
The Griggs majority completed its analysis of this issue204 by re­
manding the case to the trial court since the circuit judge had not 
decided whether Attorney Kalish was available in the police station 
and had requested to see the defendant before the defendant signed 
the written statements in which he confessed to murder.205 Thus, 
the case was remanded for a new hearing on the defendant's mo­
tion to suppress with orders for the circuit court to determine 
whether the defendant knew that an attorney had been retained for 
him and whether this attorney was present at the police station 
before the police completed their interrogation of the defendant.206 
203. Id. 
204. The court's analysis includes a discussion of two additional issues. First, the 
court concluded that the use of the defendant's statement was not "harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt" because the circuit court did use this statement in finding the de­
fendant gUilty. Id. at 270. At trial, the defendant testified that he fired the gun in self­
defense, since the group of boys, some of whom had weapons, was chasing him. Id. 
However, this information was not included in the statement that the defendant signed. 
Id.; see supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text. As such, the State was able to use 
this fact to impeach his trial testimony. 604 N.E.2d at 270. Also, the facts included in 
the signed statement differed from the facts included in a detective's supplementary 
case report. Id. These discrepancies led the court to conclude that the defendant's 
statement was not "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" because it could not "find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that this did not affect the outcome of the trial." Id. 
Second, the court found that "the circuit court did not err in refusing to return the 
indictment to the grand jury" after Count II of the indictment was amended to add the 
words "or another" following the name of the victim. Id. at 270-71. The court reasoned 
that formal amendments to indictments are allowed, whereas substantive amendments 
must be returned to the grand jury. Id. at 271. Here, the amendment was one of form. 
Id. 
205. Id. at 269; see supra note 175. 
206. 604 N.E.2d at 269. The court said: 
If the circuit court determines the attorney retained for defendant was present 
at the police station before the interrogation of defendant was completed, the 
circuit court shall determine whether the attorney had requested access to his 
client before the interrogation of defendant was completed and whether de­
fendant was so informed. If the circuit court finds that defendant knew that an 
attorney was being retained for him, that the attorp.ey was present and had 
requested access to defendant before the completion of the custodial interro­
gation of defendant, and that police refused to so inform defendant of the 
immediate availability of his attorney, the circuit court shall allow defendant's 
motion to suppress and set a date for a new trial. Under these circumstances, 
there would have been no knowing waiver of defendant's constitutional right 
against self-incrimination. 
Id. at 269-70. 
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C. Justice Clark's Concurring Opinion207 
Justice Clark wrote separately to state that the majority's deci­
sion was supported by both the Constitution of Illinois and the Fed­
eral Constitution.208 He indicated that the Illinois Constitution 
distinctly protects a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination 
and the right to speak to counse1.209 Also, Justice Clark noted that 
when police fail to inform a suspect of his or her attorney's efforts 
to contact the suspect, this interference may violate state due pro­
cess protections.210 
D. Chief Justice Miller's Dissenting Opinion211 
The dissent characterized the decision in Moran v. Burbine as 
dispositive and controlling, and concluded that the majority's hold­
ing could not be reconciled with Burbine.212 Chief Justice Miller 
reiterated many of the arguments from Burbine in concluding that 
defendant Griggs' waivers were valid.213 First, the dissent reasoned 
that events that occur outside of the presence of the suspect and of 
which the suspect is unaware have no significance on the suspect's 
ability to knowingly waive Fifth Amendment rights.214 Second, 
Chief Justice Miller adopted the Burbine argument that police in­
terference in this case has no bearing on a suspect's capacity to 
knowingly and voluntarily waive the right to counseJ.215 
The dissent then reasoned that the majority's attempt to analo­
gize the Griggs case to People v. Smith and distinguish it from 
Burbine was ftawed.216 The majority distinguished Burbine factu­
ally in two respects. First, the suspect in Burbine did not know that 
counsel was being retained, whereas the defendant in Griggs was 
aware that his sister was retaining counse1.217 Second, in Burbine, 
the attorney only telephoned the police station, whereas in Griggs, 
. the attorney actually appeared at the police station.218 However, 
the dissent concluded that these differences are meaningless and 
207. [d. at 271-72 (Clark, J., concurring). 
208. [d. at 271. 
209. [d. at 271-72. 
210. [d. at 272. 
211. [d. at 272-75 (Miller, C.J., dissenting). 
212. [d. 
213. [d. at 272-74. 
214. [d. at 272-73. 
215. [d. at 273. 
216. [d. at 273-74. 
217. [d. at 273. 
218. [d. at 273-74. 
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insignificant.219 The dissent reasoned that the majority failed to ex­
plain the importance of these differences and how they led to a re­
sult contrary to Burbine. Rather, Chief Justice Miller stated that 
this factual difference lends support to a finding of a valid waiver 
because a defendant who is aware that counsel has been retained, 
yet waives his or her right to counsel, makes a more knowing and 
intelligent waiver than a defendant who is unaware of the availabil­
ity of an identified attorney. In addition, Chief Justice Miller rea­
soned that the physical presence of an attorney at the police station 
is irrelevant because a defendant's ability to waive or assert his or 
her right to counsel is independent of any actions by the 
attorney.220 
Furthermore, the dissent stated that the majority's rule would 
be impractical and inefficient.221 The dissent claimed that the ma­
jority's rule would impose an unnecessary burden on police officers 
to pay more attention to whether a suspect's attorney has entered 
the police station and would require police officers to add to the 
traditional Miranda warnings the question of whether suspects 
know if counsel is being retained for them.222 
Also, the dissent reasoned that the majority's holding would 
"disturb the balance carefully struck in Miranda and its progeny 
between the legitimate use of police questioning as an effective tool 
219. Id. 
220. Id. Chief Justice Miller stated: 

The grounds on which the majority seeks to distinguish Burbine cannot with­

stand scrutiny. The distinction drawn between suspects who are aware that 

attorneys have been retained to represent them and suspects who lack that 
awareness is simply illusory. The majority fails to explain why a suspect's 
waiver in these circumstances must be deemed less knowing, less intelligent, or 
less voluntary merely because he [or she] already knows that counsel has been 
retained on his [or her] behalf. If a suspect's knowledge in this regard is rele­
vant at all, it argues for the contrary conclusion: it would seem that a defend­
ant who is aware that counsel has been retained to represent him [or her] yet 
chooses anyway to respond to questions has made a more knowing, more in­
telligent, and more voluntary waiver of his [or her] Miranda rights than a sus­
pect who lacks that knowledge. 
The majority's additional ground by which it would justify its departure 
from Burbine-that the attorney must actually appear at the station house 
where the defendant is being held-misapprehends the nature of the right at 
issue. I fail to see why a defendant's assertion or waiver of his [or her] right to 
counsel should be at all dependent on the actions of counsel, and on whether 
or not the attorney happens to show up at the same place where the defendant 
is then being questioned. 
Id. (Miller, C.J., dissenting). 
221. Id. at 274. 
222. Id. 
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of law enforcement and the potential misuse of the interrogation 
process to obtain coerced confessions."223 The dissent stated that 
Miranda reconciled these competing interests by giving defendants 
some control over their interrogations by requiring that questioning 
cease once a defendant requests counsel and that questioning be 
reinitiated only at the defendant's request.224 Therefore, Miranda 
offers sufficient safeguards to protect suspects during custodial 
interrogations.225 
Lastly, the dissent mentioned that, in its opinion, a different 
result would not follow from the Illinois Constitution since it does 
not suggest a wider basis for the privilege against self-incrimina­
tion.226 Thus, the same result would be reached under state consti­
tutional law.227 
III. ANALYSIS 
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution228 
mandates that federal law, including Federal Constitutional provi­
sions, overrides both state law and state constitutional provisions in 
matters where the laws or constitutional provisions conflict.229 
Thus, since the Supreme Court of Illinois decided Griggs on the 
basis of the Federal Constitution, it was required to apply United 
States Supreme Court cases which have ruled on the same issue. 
However, if the United States Supreme Court had never considered 
the issue presented in Griggs, the Illinois Supreme Court would 
have been free to develop its own interpretation and resolution of 
the Fifth Amendment as it applied to this issue.23o Thus, if the issue 
presented in Griggs differed from that in Burbine, the Illinois 
Supreme Court could reject the holding in Burbine. However, if 
Burbine addressed the issue in Griggs, the court was required to 
adhere to Burbine. 
Alternatively, if a state wishes to provide its citizenry with 
more expansIve protections than those provided by the Federal 
223. Id. 
224. Id. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. 
228. The Supremacy Clause states, in part: "This Constitution, and the Laws of 
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
229. See Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional 
Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1331-47 (1982). 
230. Id. 
354 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:329 
Constitution, a state court can decide an issue on the basis of its 
state constitution. In such a situation, however, Federal Constitu­
tional protections are a minimum below which a state is not permit­
ted to gO.231 Thus, a state can only grant equivalent or greater 
protections under its own constitution than the Federal Constitu­
tion would grant.232 
The Illinois Supreme Court decided Griggs on the basis of the 
United States Constitution.233 However, it found that Griggs was 
sufficiently distinguishable from Burbine such that Burbine was not 
controlling.234 Thus, having determined that it was faced with an 
issue that the United States Supreme Court had not ruled on, the 
Griggs court adopted the reasoning and holding in Smith, a case 
that it deemed to be extremely similar.235 
However, the Griggs court's efforts to distinguish Burbine 
seem unconvincing. Despite some factual differences between the 
two cases, the reasoning and principles behind Burbine are directly 
applicable to Griggs. Rather than this unpersuasive attempt to dis­
tinguish Burbine, there are alternative and more convincing analy­
ses that the court could have used to reach its result. 
A. 	 A Distinction Without a Difference-the Griggs Court's 
Analysis Is Unpersuasive 
In Burbine, the defendant's sister retained counsel for Burbine, 
who subsequently telephoned the police station to inform the police 
that she would represent him during questioning.236 Burbine was 
unaware of both his sister's actions and the actions of his attor­
ney.237 The United States Supreme Court concluded that the de­
fendant's waiver was valid.238 In contrast, Griggs' sister informed 
him that she was in the process of retaining an attorney.239 How­
ever, upon arriving at the police station, the attorney was not per­
231. 	 See Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 169,171-95 (1983); Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitu­
tions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1141-80 
(1985); Cathleen C. Herasimchuk, The New Federalism: Judicial Legislation by the 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals?, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1481, 1485-98 (1990). 
232. See supra note 231. 
233. See People v. Griggs, 604 N.E.2d 257 (Ill. 1992). 
234. Id. at 267. 
235. Id. at 267-70. 
236. Burbine v. Moran, 475 U.S. 412, 416-17 (1986). 
237. Id. at 417. 
238. Id. at 424; see supra notes 61-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
Burbine. 
239. Griggs, 604 N.E.2d at 258. 
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mitted to consult with Griggs until he had been interrogated.240 
Griggs was not informed of his attorney's presence and requests 'to 
see him until after he had supplied incriminating statements.241 The 
Supreme Court of Illinois concluded that Griggs' waiver was 
invalid.242 
The Griggs court held that Griggs was sufficiently distinguish­
able from Burbine so that Burbine was not controlling.243 The 
Supreme Court of Illinois grounded its conclusion primarily on the 
facts that, in Griggs, the defendant knew that his sister was in the 
process of retaining an attorney and the attorney was present at the 
police station, whereas in Burbine, the defendant was unaware that 
his sister had contacted and retained a Public Defender who tele­
phoned the police station. However, aside from disagreeing with 
the reasoning in Burbine, the Supreme Court of Illinois never ex­
plained why this factual distinction is relevant and how this distinc­
tion caused the court to hold that Burbine is not applicable, 
whereas Smith is dispositive.244 
1. Should Burbine Have Been Distinguished? 
The Griggs court rejected the primary argument that supports 
Burbine, namely that "[e]vents occurring outside of the presence of 
the suspect and entirely unknown to ... [the suspect] surely can 
have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly re­
linquish a constitutional right. "245 Instead, the Griggs court con­
cluded that a waiver obtained without having informed a suspect of 
his or her attorney's availability cannot be "made with a full aware­
ness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the conse­
quences of the decision to abandon it."246 Thus, according to the 
Griggs majority, a suspect cannot knowingly and intelligently waive 
his or her right to counsel without having been informed of an at­
torney's presence and desire to consult with the suspect.247 
The Griggs court's attempt to distinguish Burbine is flawed in 
two respects. First, the distinction that the Griggs court draws is 
240. [d. at 260. 
241. [d. 
242. [d. at 269; see supra notes 141-227 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
Griggs. 
243. Griggs, 604 N.E.2d at 267. 
244. See supra notes 189-93 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 212-27 
and accompanying text. 
245. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422 (1986). 
246. Griggs, 604 N.E.2d at 268 (quoting Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421). 
247. [d. at 269. 
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meaningless. In both cases, the defendants' attorneys were reach­
ing out to aid their clients and in both cases, their attempts were 
thwarted by the police.248 In both situations, therefore, events oc­
curred outside of the presence of the defendants. Yet, if, as Burbine 
decided, an attorney's attempts to consult with a client where the 
client is unaware of the attorney's identity has no bearing on the 
client's ability to understand and waive a constitutional right, the 
fact that a suspect knows that a specific attorney is being retained 
should not change the result. The police provided Griggs with his 
complete Miranda warnings.249 He knew that he could remain si­
lent or request an attorney. He also knew that any statements 
made could be admitted in a subsequent court proceeding. Yet, he' 
still chose to waive his rights and answer the police officer's ques­
tions. Thus, his waiver seems no less knowing and intelligent than 
Burbine's waiver.250 
Indeed, if anything, Griggs' waiver was even more knowing 
and intelligent than Burbine's. It would seem that a defendant, 
armed with the knowledge that there is an identified attorney with 
whom the defendant can choose to consult by simply invoking the 
Fifth Amendment right to counsel, makes a more intelligent and 
more knowing waiver of the right to counsel than.a defendant who 
does not know that there is a particular attorney available with 
whom to consult.251 The Griggs court's summary conclusion that 
this waiver was less intelligent and less knowing than that in 
Burbine is unexplained and appears inexplicable. 
2. Which State Court Case Should Apply? 
Having distinguished Burbine on factual grounds, the Griggs 
court then considered the relevant state court cases that have inter­
preted the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
First, the Griggs court rejected252 People v. Holland,253 a Supreme 
248, The fact that the police in Burbine accomplished this by misleading the attor­
ney into not coming to the police station, as opposed to physically barring access as in 
Griggs, seemed to make no difference for purposes of Miranda. See Miranda v. Ari­
zona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
249. Griggs, 604 N,E.2d at 259, 263. 
250. See supra note 79. 
251. This argument is persuasively made in Griggs, 604 N.E.2d at 272-75 (Miller, 
C.l" dissenting), Matney v, Armontrout, 956 F.2d 824, 826 (8th Cir. 1992), and People 
v. Ledesma, 251 Cal. Rptr, 417, 423 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). See supra notes 120-30 and 
220 and accompanying text. 
252. Griggs, 604 N.E.2d at 267, 
253. 520 N.E.2d 270 (Ill. 1987), affd, 493 U.S. 474 (1990). 
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Court of Illinois case decided after Burbine and which followed the 
reasoning and holding of Burbine.254 Since the Griggs court distin­
guished Burbine, this rejection of Holland was necessary. Holland 
was decided under the Federal Constitution and involved a factual 
situation similar to Burbine and an issue which the United States 
Supreme Court had already considered in Burbine.255 
Having also distinguished Holland, the court then examined 
People v. Smith256 and found it applicable.257 The Supreme Court 
of Illinois, in Smith, was confronted with ~ fact pattern similar to 
that in Griggs in that Smith had personally consulted with and re­
tained an attorney prior to the interrogation.258 Thus, as in Griggs, 
defendant Smith knew of an identified attorney who was available 
and could be present during any questioning.259 However, the 
Smith court did not discuss this fact, aside from including it in a 
description of the factual background of the case.260 Instead, the 
Smith court concentrated on the issue of police interference in 
preventing the attorney, who later arrived at the jail, from consult­
ing with Smith and failing to inform Smith of the attempted 
consultation.261 
The Smith court's reasoning was supported by various cases 
which similarly focused solely on police interference with an attor­
ney's attempt to consult with a suspect-client and in which the de­
fendant was unaware that an attorney had been retained.262 In 
addition, the Smith court's holding stressed this aspect of the case 
254. [d. at 277-78. 
255. See supra notes 105-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of Holland. 
256. 442 N.E.2d 1325 (III. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 937 (1983); see supra notes 
46-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of Smith. 
257. Griggs, 604 N.E.2d at 267-69. 
258. Smith, 442 N.E.2d at 1326. 
259. [d. 
260. [d. 
261. [d. at 1326-29. The Smith court stated that "there was not a knowing and 
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel during the interrogation in view of the interfer­
ence with [Attorney] Ellerby's effort to consult with the defendant." [d. at 1328. 
262. [d. at 1328-29. These cases include State v. Matthews, 408 So. 2d 1274 (La. 
1982); Commonwealth v. McKenna, 244 N.E.2d 560 (Mass. 1969); State v. Haynes, 602 
P.2d 272 (Or. 1979) (en bane), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 945 (1980); State v. Jones, 578 P.2d 
71 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978). See supra notes 39-44, and 99 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of these cases. It is important to note that while, in McKenna, the defendants 
had each asked a relative to contact an attorney, this factor did not playa vital role in 
the court's decision. A later case, Commonwealth v. Sherman, 450 N.E.2d 566 (Mass. 
1983), indicated that this fact was not a distinguishing factor in McKenna and that the 
holding was "expressly based" on the sergeant's failure to notify the defendant that his 
attorney requested to be present during any interrogations. [d. at 570. 
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and not whether the suspect had, in fact, retained an attorney nor if 
the suspect knew that an attorney was being retained.263 The court 
held that: 
when police, prior to or during custodial interrogation, refuse an 
attorney appointed or retained to assist a suspect access to the 
suspect, there can be no knowing waiver of the right to counsel if 
the suspect has not been informed that the attorney was present 
and seeking to consult with him.264 
Thus, the factor which the Griggs court uses to distinguish Griggs 
from Burbine, namely the defendant's awareness that an attorney 
had been retained, is insignificant since the cases that Griggs relied 
upon do not view this factor as important. 
The language in the Smith court's holding265 and the cases 
upon which it relied to reach its holding266 indicate that the 
Supreme Court of Illinois sought to establish a rule for Illinois 
courts to apply when confronted with the situation of interference 
in an attorney's attempts to access a client who subsequently waives 
the right to counsel,267 Thus, the only critical factor is whether an 
attorney attempted to and was prevented from consulting with a 
client prior to or during interrogation, regardless of any contacts 
that a suspect had with an attorney prior to interrogation or any 
knowledge that an attorney is being or has been retained.268 
Although Smith is applicable to Griggs, since its holding en­
compasses the issue in Griggs, Smith is not the proper authority for 
the distinction that the Griggs court draws. Rather, Burbine is the 
proper authority since it also addressed the issue presented in 
Griggs. Burbine is the United States Supreme Court case interpret­
ing the United States Constitution on this matter; thus, it takes pre­
cedence over Smith, a state court decision interpreting the United 
States Constitution.269 
3. Other "Precedents" or Persuasive Cases 
An examination of the other cases that the Supreme Court of 
Illinois used as precedent in Griggs also demonstrates that the ma­
263. Smith, 442 N.E.2d at 1329. 
264. Id. 
265. See supra note 264 and accompanying text. 
266. See supra note 262 and accompanying text. 
261. Smith, 442 N.E.2d at 1328-29. 
268. Id. 
269. See supra notes 228-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
Supremacy Clause. 
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jority's rejection of Burbine and application of Smith is unpersua­
sive. In reaffirming the court's holding in Smith, the court points to 
various cases, none of which support the majority's decision.270 The 
court cited many cases with holdings similar to Smith, but which 
were decided on the basis of state constitutions.271 Although the 
principles derived from these cases are illustrative, their holdings 
are ultimately irrelevant to an analysis of Griggs, since Griggs was 
decided on the basis of the Federal Constitution.272 
Aside from those cases that were decided on the basis of a 
state constitution, the Griggs court relied on State v. Haynes,273 a 
case decided before Burbine. However, the Haynes decision does 
not provide a basis for distinguishing Smith from Burbine, or for 
distinguishing Griggs from Burbine. The defendant in Haynes was 
unaware that an attorney had been retained.274 Thus, the facts in 
Haynes are more similar to those in Burbine than to either Smith or 
Griggs. As such, Haynes is also irrelevant as support for the Griggs 
court's decision to reject Burbine.275 
4. Other Cases That Griggs Ignored 
The Griggs decision also conflicts with various other cases 
which are remarkably similar to Griggs and in which the courts 
found the defendants' waivers to be valid. In both People v. 
Ledesma276 and Matney v. Armontrout,277 the defendants had per­
sonally retained counse1.278 In State v. Earls279 and Middleton v. 
Murphy,280 the defendants had asked their wives to contact attor­
neys.281 In Griggs, the defendant's sister told him that she would 
retain an attorney for him.282 This is identical to both Earls and 
Middleton. Also, it is analo·gous to Ledesma and Matney, since 
whether a defendant knows that someone is retaining an attorney 
on his or her behalf or personally retains one, there is a specified 
270. People v. Griggs, 604 N.E.2d 257, 267-68 (III. 1992). 
271. Id.; see supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. 
272. See Griggs, 604 N.E.2d 257. 
273. 602 P.2d 272 (Or. 1979) (en banc), cen. denied, 446 U.S. 945 (1980). 
274. Id. at 273-74; see supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text. 
275. Griggs, 604 N.E.2d at 267-69. 
276. 251 Cal. Rptr. 417 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
277. 956 F.2d 824 (8th Cir. 1992). 
278. See supra notes 120-30 and accompanying text. 
279. 805 P.2d 211 (Wash. 1991). 
280. 996 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir.), available as No. 92-1498, 1993 WL 217156, cert. 
denied, 114 S. Ct. 607 (1993). 
281. See supra notes 131-40 and accompanying text. 
282. Griggs, 604 N.E.2d at 258. 
360 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:329 
attorney whose identity the defendant is aware of and whom the 
defendant can contact. However, while Burbine was rejected in 
Griggs, Burbine was held binding in all four of these other cases.283 
Thus, the factual difference between Burbine and these cases, which 
is the same fact upon which Griggs distinguished Burbine, has not 
persuaded other courts as to the inapplicability of the Burbine hold­
ing. In fact, the courts noted that Burbine was applicable despite 
the factual difference.284 Furthermore, the Ledesma and Matney 
courts both reasoned that a waiver of the right to counsel is more 
knowing and intelligent when a defendant personally retains 
counsel.285 
B. 	 An Explanation of the Griggs Court's Conclusion and 
Alternatives to Its Analysis 
1. 	 Criticisms of Burbine 
Although the analysis in Griggs is flawed, it is understandable 
why the court reached its conclusion. The Burbine decision has 
been plagued with criticisms. The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
stated that "[e]ven though we do not find the Court's reasoning ... 
to be persuasive, we are nevertheless bound by its interpretation of 
the Federal Constitution. "286 In addition, the holding in Burbine 
has been described as "disturbing" because it sanctions police inter­
ference in the attorney-client relationship and misconduct in terms 
of lying to attorneys and withholding information from suspects.287 
Furthermore, the decision has been labelled as unethicaF88 and un­
clear in that it leaves the door open for suspects to raise a Four­
teenth Amendment due process argument in place of a Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel argument under these facts, yet fails 
to establish clear guidelines by which courts can determine if due 
process rights have been violated.289 
283. 	 See supra notes 120-40 and accompanying text. 
284. 	 See supra notes 120-40 and accompanying text. 
285. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text; see also supra note 220 and 
accompanying text for Chief Justice Miller's dissenting opinion in Griggs. 
286. 	 Lodowski v. State, 513 A.2d 299, 304 (Md. 1986). 
287. Alexander H. Pitofsky, Comment, A Missed Opportunity to Curb Police De­
ception ofCriminal Defense Attorneys, Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986),25 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 89, 106-09 (1987). 
288. Althea Kuller, Note, Moran v. Burbine: Supreme Court Tolerates Police In
terference With the Attorney-Client Relationship, 18 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 251, 280-81 
(1986). 
289. Daniel J. Lynch, Note, Moran v. Burbine: Constitutional Rights of Custodial 
Suspects, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 331, 349-51 (1987). 
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Perhaps the most severe criticism of Burbine is that it "betrays 
the spirit of Miranda" by allowing police officers to deceive attor­
neys and by encouraging "incommunicado interrogation."290 
Although not a complete protection of criminal defendants, the Mi­
randa warnings were created to reduce the coerciveness that is in­
herent in police interrogations.291 In order for these warnings to 
achieve their stated purpose, it is imperative both that they are pro­
vided and that their purpose is not obstructed.292 Thus, it has been 
argued that: 
The [Burbine] majority ... failed to recognize the fundamental 
difference between the abstract right to counsel communicated 
through a police officer's recital of the Miranda litany, and the 
concrete right to the assistance of a particular lawyer who pres­
ently is available and seeking to represent the suspect. A suspect 
who is willing to waive the abstract right may not be willing to 
waive the concrete right. Consequently, a suspect's waiver of his 
[or her] abstract right to counsel should not be deemed sufficient 
to waive the concrete right to consult with an attorney presently 
available and seeking to render assistance. When an attorney has 
attempted to represent a suspect in custody, there should be no 
finding of valid waiver unless the suspect has been informed of 
his [or her] attorney's efforts.293 
By failing to inform a suspect that his or her attorney is presently 
available to consult with the suspect, Miranda becomes a solely for­
mal prescription and an empty promise.294 Perhaps, by refusing to 
290. The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Leading Cases, 100 HARv. L. REV. 100, 126 
(1986). 
291. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455 (1966). 
292. Kuller, supra note 288, at 276. 
293. Kuller, supra note 288, at 276 (footnote omitted). 
294. Since Miranda was decided, subsequent United States Supreme Court cases 
have clarified that Miranda provides a formalistic limit on police conduct. See Moran v. 
Burbine,475 U.S. 412, 424-27 (1986). See also New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990); 
Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987); 
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); Ed­
wards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). Miranda presumes that once the warnings are 
provided, any coercion associated with custodial interrogation has been removed. 
Thus, once the warnings are given to a suspect and the suspect waives the rights to 
silence and counsel, Miranda has completed its goal in removing the coercion inherent 
in interrogations. It is unnecessary, therefore, to ask whether a defendant was actually 
coerced into confessing. See Joseph D. Grano, Miranda v. Arizona and the Legal Mind: 
Formalism's Triumph Over Substance and Reason, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 243, 245, 258 
(1987); The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Leading Cases, 100 HARv. L. REV. 100, 131 
(1986). 
In contrast, the Supreme Court of Illinois, in Griggs, offered a functional or sub­
stantive view of the right to counsel. It was not enough that Griggs was provided with 
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admit statements that a criminal defendant makes while his or her 
attorney is in the next room demanding that the interrogation cease 
and that he or she be permitted to speak with his or her client, yet 
being prevented from doing so by the police officers who wish to 
obtain an incriminating statement from the defendant, the Griggs 
court was attempting to add some substance to this promise and to 
substantially decrease the coercion inherent in interrogations in or­
der to put suspects and their interrogators on a more equal footing. 
2. An Alternative Analysis to Reach the Desired Result of 
Griggs 
In an effort to preserve and expand the Fifth Amendment right 
to counsel during custodial interrogations in Illinois, the court 
should have analyzed Griggs differently to reach the same conclu­
sion. There are two alternative means of analysis that the Griggs 
court could have adopted which would have reached the same re­
sult, but in a more convincing manner. 
First, the court could have applied a Fourteenth Amendment 
due process argument, as suggested in Burbine,295 by arguing that 
the police conduct in Griggs was more offensive and egregious than 
that in Burbine such that it "shocked the sensibilities of a civilized 
society."296 In Burbine, a police officer lied to the defendant's at­
torney about whether Burbine would be questioned that evening.297 
In contrast, in Griggs, the defendant's attorney knew that Griggs 
was being interrogated, yet was prevented from interrupting the in­
terrogation to speak with his client.298 Arguably, the police of­
ficer's interference in Griggs is more offensive because Griggs' 
attorney was physically present at the police station and demanded 
that the desk sergeant stop the interrogation. It was quite feasible 
for the desk sergeant to do so. In Burbine, on the other hand, the 
attorney spoke with an unidentified police officer on the telephone 
who, while he told the attorney that Burbine would not be ques­
tioned that evening, may not have been aware of the actual subse­
quent interrogation.299 
his Miranda warnings. The court demanded that the warnings be given effect by in­
forming Griggs of his attorney's desire to consult with him and allowing this consulta­
tion to occur. Only then would Griggs be shielded adequately from a coercive 
interrogation. See Griggs, 604 N.E.2d 257. 
295. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text. 
296. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 432-34 (1986). 
297. Id. at 415. 
298. Griggs, 604 N.E.2d at 259-60. 
299. It is also feasible, however, that a court, upon examining the totality of the 
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Second, the Griggs majority could have decided Griggs on the 
basis of the Illinois Constitution.3°O The Appellate Court of Illinois 
had the opportunity to do this in People v. McCauley.3ot In Mc­
Cauley, a suspect was arrested and brought to the police station. 
While he waited at the police station, a relative hired an attorney, 
who subsequently went to the police station and demanded to con­
sult with the defendant.302 The sergeant refused the attorney access 
to McCauley.303 Before trial, the defendant filed a motion to sup­
press his lineup identification and any statements he made.304 The 
Appellate Court of Illinois held that: 
in Illinois, if a suspect's family hires an attorney to represent ... 
[the suspect] while he [or she] is in police custody and the police 
deny the attorney access to him [or her] and later obtain a lineup 
identification or statements from him [or her], it violates the sus­
pect's self-incrimination protection afforded ... [Illinois] citizens 
by the constitution of Illinois.305 
The court reached this conclusion because it reasoned that the Illi­
nois Constitution gives its citizens more protection than the Federal 
Constitution as interpreted in Burbine.306 Therefore, if the facts of 
Griggs were presented to an Illinois court again and were analyzed 
circumstances surrounding these incidents, would find the conduct in Burbine to be 
more egregious than that in Griggs. The police officer affirmatively lied to and 
deceived Burbine's attorney, whereas the desk sergeant was truthful with Griggs' attor­
ney. He merely refused to stop the interrogation and let the attorney consult with 
Griggs. Since the police officers in Burbine did not violate the defendant's Fourteenth 
Amendment due process rights, the rights of Griggs would similarly not have been 
violated. 
It is difficult to predict how a court would rule in such a situation because the 
Burbine majority did not provide a substantive standard to aid lower courts in applying 
its "shock the conscience" test in police deception and interference cases. See Moran v. 
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 432·34, 466-68 (1986). See also The Supreme Court, 1985 Term­
Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REv. 100, 134 (1986); Daniel J. Lynch, Note, Moran v. 
Burbine: Constitutional Rights of Custodial Suspects, 34 WAYNE L. REv. 331, 350-51 
(1987); Paul M. Moretti, Comment, Moran v. Burbine: Duty to Inform, Police Decep­
tion and the Egregious Standard for Miranda, 23 NEW ENG. L. REV. 151, 182-83 (1988). 
300. The relevant provision of the Illinois Constitution states: "No person shall 
be compelled in a criminal case to give evidence against himself [or herself) nor be 
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." ILL. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
301. 595 N.E.2d 583 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). 
302. Id. at 584. 
303. Id. at 585. 
304. Id. 
305. Id. at 585-86. 
306. Id. at 586. Justice Clark, concurring in Griggs, also believed that the Illinois 
Constitution would render a waiver in a factual situation similar to Griggs invalid. See 
supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text. 
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on the basis of the Illinois Constitution, the court may invalidate 
the waiver. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution re­
quires that, where the Federal Constitution is at issue, United 
States Supreme Court cases which have spoken on the particular 
issue be applied. Moran v. Burbine defined the rights of a criminal 
defendant when an attorney has been retained and the attorney's 
attempts to consult with the suspect are thwarted by the police. A 
similar situation was presented in People v. Griggs, with one slight 
variation. Griggs knew that an attorney was being retained for him, 
whereas Burbine was unaware of this fact. Yet, while the Griggs 
court used this difference to reject Burbine, the distinction is in fact 
meaningless and does not alter the applicability of Burbine. 
Thus, the waiver in Griggs should have been found to be valid. 
However, the Griggs court arrived at the opposite conclusion, with 
a strained analysis. While the court reached the desirable result, it 
did not reach the correct result under the law. 
Chrisoula 1. Roumeliotis 
